The University of San Francisco

USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Economics

College of Arts and Sciences

2001

Microenterprise Lending to Female Entrepreneurs:
Sacrificing Economic Growth for Poverty
Alleviation?
Michael Kevane
Bruce Wydick
University of San Francisco, wydick@lucas.usfca.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/econ
Part of the Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Michael Kevane, Bruce Wydick. Microenterprise Lending to Female Entrepreneurs: Sacrificing Economic Growth for Poverty
Alleviation? World Development. Volume 29, Issue 7, July 2001, Pages 1225–1236. DOI: 10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00032-8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson
Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.

WORLD DEVELOPMENT: Manuscript 1999:000535

Microenterprise Lending to Female Entrepreneurs:
Sacrificing Economic Growth for Poverty Alleviation?
Keywords: Central America, Guatemala, Microenterprise Finance, Gender Issues
January 2001
Michael Kevane
Department of Economics
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, CA 95051
mkevane@scu.edu
Bruce Wydick
Department of Economics
University of San Francisco
San Francisco, CA 94117-1080
wydick@usfca.edu

Abstract: This research compares the performance of female and male
entrepreneurs in a microenterprise credit program in Guatemala. Previous research
and field practice has suggested that targeting credit at female borrowers allows for
more substantial increases in household welfare, but that male entrepreneurs may
more aggressively expand enterprises when given access to credit. In this paper, we
develop a model that shows that increases in value of home time during
childbearing years for women may substantially account for gender differences in
responses to credit access. Empirical results from Guatemalan survey data yield
estimations consistent with the predictions from our model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have witnessed an astounding proliferation of microenterprise
credit programs throughout the developing world. In the coming years, the number and scope
of such programs will greatly increase. As development policy makers and the poor alike
have become weary of costly and wasteful large-scale development projects, microenterprise
finance has rapidly emerged as a primary tool for alleviating world poverty. The success of
the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the ACCION-affiliated credit programs in Latin
America richly illustrate how the productivity of the poor in less developed countries can be
unleashed through millions of small injections of credit.
Providing credit to the poor serves a dual purpose. As borrowed capital is invested in
a small enterprise, it often results in significant short-term increase in household expenditure
and welfare (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). However, a second goal of microenterprise credit
programs is to spur economic growth in the informal sector through fostering increased
capitalization of businesses, employment creation, and long-term income growth. This paper
examines the possible trade-off between these goals, especially as they relate to the
increasing practice of targeting credit at female entrepreneurs.
A large and growing number of recipients of microenterprise credit are women. For
example, female entrepreneurs comprise 93 percent of the Grameen Bank's current portfolio
of 1.2 million borrowers, an increase from 39 percent in the early 1980s. Female
entrepreneurs regularly make up greater than half of borrowers in ACCION-affiliated credit
programs in Latin America, and the share of female borrowers has continued to grow over
time (Inter-American Development Bank, 1997).
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There are several important reasons for the dramatic increase in credit targeted at
female entrepreneurs in developing countries. The first is the increasing proportion of
women in both developed and developing countries involved in entrepreneurial activity. In
Canada, for example, the number of female entrepreneurs tripled between 1976 and 1994
(Cohen, 1996), such that today women account for one in three entrepreneurs in the Canadian
economy. Tokman (1989) describes the increasing "feminization" of the self-employed
informal sector in Latin American countries in recent decades. Berger (1989) estimates that
women own or operate roughly one-third of all informal sector businesses, though of course
data on women's self-employment is notoriously poor in developing countries. Most likely
the share of women in informal business has increased dramatically in recent decades.
Reasons for the feminization of informal sector include the limited absorptive capacity and
difficulty of entry into the formal sector for women, macroeconomic dislocation and
adjustment (especially during the 1980s), and changes in household gender norms. All of
these factors have led to a growing percentage of households worldwide that are supported
solely by women (Berger, 1989; Clark, 1991).
A second explanation for the rising proportion of female borrowers in credit programs
is that, along with issues of economic growth, the NGO-dominated microenterprise credit
industry has often specifically sought to address issues of women's empowerment in
developing countries. Much recent research has shown that access to credit generates a form
of economic empowerment which can greatly enhance a woman's self-esteem and status
within the family (Goetz and Gupta, 1995). Separate empirical studies by Hashemi et al.
(1996) and Amin et al. (1998) have explored the relationship between women's
empowerment and participation in microcredit programs. Using empowerment indices such
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as a women's independent decision-making ability within the household, freedom from
restrictions on daily activity, and increased authority and household decision-making, the
studies find that women in Bangladesh with access to credit score higher than women without
credit access, even after controlling for self-selection effects.
In addition, many NGOs and other development institutions prefer to direct credit
toward women since studies show that when credit is given to women, it has a greater impact
on household welfare than credit directed toward male borrowers. Jiggins (1989), for
example, portrays the female enterprise as an institution whose primary purpose is to ensure
subsistence consumption for members of the household, in contrast to male enterprises, in
which returns are often higher, but more risky. McKee (1989) and Downing (1990) note the
strong relationship that typically exists between a woman's entrepreneurial income and family
welfare, revealing that women have a particular propensity to redirect earnings from a
microenterprise to household and children's needs. Pitt and Khandker (1998) show, in a
sample of poor households in Bangladesh, that household consumption expenditure increased
18 taka for every 100 additional taka borrowed by women while the increase was only 11
taka for every 100 taka borrowed by men. They also find that credit for women had a
positive effect on both girls and boys schooling.
An important question, however, is whether this increase in household welfare comes
at the expense of economic growth. If so, then targeting credit at women in developing
countries may embody a trade-off of long-term economic growth for poverty alleviation, and
more immediate improvements in welfare. McKee (1989) argues that "... microentrepreneurs are often seeking modest improvements in the stability and level of their
earnings, and do not necessarily give high priority to business expansion through
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reinvestment of profits at the expense of consumption. Women in particular, may prefer to
allocate earnings to improve housing or their children's education."
There is currently a heated debate in the literature over whether this trade-off exists.
Downing (1990) describes gender differences in investment behavior: while male borrowers
tend to invest in a single relatively high-yielding project, women tend to diversify their
entrepreneurial activity to guarantee a subsistence level of household income. Studies such as
Matienzo (1993) show significantly higher rates of return on capital and enterprise expansion
by male borrowers. Yet, some such as Clark (1991) assert that "women who do have access
to the benefits of microenterprise assistance programs perform as well as or better than their
male counterparts in generating employment and operating their businesses." Other studies
such as Blumberg (1989) are more critical of male entrepreneurs, arguing that men have a
higher propensity to spend earned income on clothing and entertainment for themselves while
women have a tendency to invest their earnings in the food, clothing, and human capital of
their children. This debate spills over into the discussion over microenterprise sustainability
(see Mosley and Hulme 1998, and Morduch 1998): Does targeting lending to the very poor
preclude full cost-recovery because the returns on their projects are too low to repay high
interest rates?
This paper seeks to contribute to this debate in two ways. In Section II we present a
simple model of a household enterprise, which is intended to clarify potential differences in
male and female entrepreneurial behavior, particularly in terms of their responsiveness to
credit. Predictions from the model show that differences in the entrepreneurial behavior
between men and women may stem from differences in initial scales of production, labor
supervision costs, and differences in the marginal value of home time relative to the marginal
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value of income. In Section III of the paper we then compare the insights of the model with
data from an ACCION-affiliated credit institution in Guatemala. We perform estimations on
first-hand survey data of 342 entrepreneurs in western Guatemala. Our results show that
while there are significant differences between female and male-owned enterprises in terms
of employment generation, female entrepreneurs overall show little statistically significant
difference from their male counterparts in their ability to generate increases in sales. The
differences that do exist in employment generation seem to be mainly attributed to the time
constraints placed on women during childbearing and childrasing years. Section IV offers a
summary of the results of the paper and policy implications for field practice.

2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF A HOUSEHOLD ENTERPRISE

Consider a model of a household enterprise for which there are three inputs: capital, hired
labor, and an entrepreneur's own labor. The entrepreneur (male or female) is faced with two
constraints: a time constraint equal to unity (the waking hours of a single day), and a working
capital constraint equal to Ω . The entrepreneur faces cost outlays of r per unit of employed
capital, K, and a wage for each unit of hired labor, L, also set equal to one. The
entrepreneur’s time can be spent in home activity, m, self-employed labor, l , and labor
supervision in the amount of s ∈ (0, 1) per unit of employed labor, L, so that m + l + sL = 1 .

We will assume that the entrepreneur’s utility function has arguments in both net income
(enterprise output minus rental payments and wages), Φ , and home activity, m. We also
assume that capital makes own and hired labor more productive, and that there are
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diminishing returns to increases in a single input and to home activity, Specifically,

Φ12 > 0, Φ11 < 0, Φ 22 < 0, and h11 < 0. The entrepreneur thus faces the maximization problem
max Z = Φ(K , L + l ) + h(1 − l − sL ) − rK − L + λ (Ω − rK − L )
K,L,l,λ

with first order conditions given in (1-4):
(1)

∂Z
= Φ1 − (1 + λ )r = 0
∂K

(2)

∂Z
= Φ 2 − (1 + λ ) − sh1 = 0
∂L

(3)

∂Z
= Φ 2 − h1 = 0
∂l

(4)

∂Z
= Ω − rK − L = 0
∂λ

Our purpose is to focus on the insights that the model provides into differences in
behavior of female in male entrepreneurs. We do this by first making some general
assumptions about gender asymmetries in traditional societies. Using the model, we then see
how these general assumptions about behavior translate into specific differences between
behavior of male and female entrepreneurs. We will concern ourselves with how important
gender asymmetries affect two measures of enterprise growth: increases in hired labor and
increases in gross income (sales) in the household enterprise. These measures of growth are
of primary concern to NGOs operating credit programs in developing countries because they
are closely related to the commonly articulated goals of economic growth and poverty
reduction, respectively.

6

In nearly all developing countries, male and female entrepreneurs differ substantially
in their access to credit. While credit access is notoriously poor in the informal sector in
developing countries even for male entrepreneurs, in the absence of intervention in credit
markets, access to credit is particularly poor for women (Jiggins, 1989; World Bank, 1989;
Clark, 1991). This creates a substantial restriction on the size of many female enterprises. In
the first-order conditions given in (1) and (2), λ represents the shadow value of working
capital to the household enterprise. As seen in (1) and (2), as the shadow value of working
capital increases for women, the equilibrium level of capitalization and hired labor in the
female informal sector enterprise declines. This may help explain the vast number of female
household enterprises in developing countries that are operated solely through self-employed
female labor.
Even apart from the central issue of credit access, there are other important gender
asymmetries that may have important effects on the size and growth of female enterprises. In
traditional societies, the marginal value of home activity is routinely higher for women than
for men, especially at low levels of m. Norms in traditional societies often dictate that
women be the primary caregivers to children, having primary responsibility for preparation of
meals, and household chores. This renders the function h′(⋅) quite steep at low levels of m
for females relative to males in most developing country households, however the value of
this function will be influenced by social norms (see Kevane and Wydick, 2001). The
extreme case of h′(⋅) = ∞ , would imply a constraint against female entrepreneurship. A
"flatter" h(⋅) function, more likely in the case of male household heads, allows for more
substitutability between home and work time.
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We can use the first-order conditions of the model to look at the impact of differences
in the value of home time between female on male enterprises ex ante to credit provision.
The marginal value of home time enters the first-order conditions in (2) and (3), governing
the optimal allocation of own labor and hired labor within the enterprise, respectively. In
both instances, a higher marginal value of home time for women implies that female
enterprises will utilize less own labor and less hired labor, and are therefore likely to be
smaller than those operated by male entrepreneurs. This is consistent with the descriptive
data from the Guatemalan survey presented in Table 1. Female enterprises have a mean of
0.73 employees before credit access compared to a mean of 1.02 for male enterprises.
A third asymmetry between male and female entrepreneurs in traditional societies are
societal norms that may make it more difficult for women to act as supervisors of hired labor.
These norms may make it particularly difficult for women to hire and supervise male
workers. The inability, or at least reluctance, of a female entrepreneur to discipline a
negligent male employee may lead to moral hazard problems in the workplace. Adding
additional workers to an enterprise, especially after a certain level, often begins to tax the
management skills of less-educated entrepreneurs in the informal sector. Women, often at a
disadvantage with respect to men in terms of education and leadership experience, may
consequently face disadvantages in worker supervision. As seen in (2), a greater cost of
supervision, s, for women constrains the equilibrium size of women’s enterprises.
We now examine changes in the household enterprise that come as a result of access
to credit. Totally differentiating equations (1-4) yields the following set of equations given in
matrix notation:
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(1’-4’)

 Φ 11
Φ
 21
Φ 21

−r

Φ 12
Φ 22 + s 2 h11

(

)

(Φ 22 + sh11 )
−1

Φ 12
− r  dK   0 
(Φ 22 + sh11 ) − 1  dL   0 
=
[dΩ]
Φ 22 + h11
0   dl   0 
   
0
0   dλ  − 1

Defining the 4x4 matrix in (1’-4’) as A, we find through Laplace expansion that the
determinant of A is negative, given the standard assumptions that Φ11Φ 22 − Φ12 Φ12 > 0 .

Using Cramer’s rule, we can calculate the effect of improved access to credit on employment
creation within the household enterprise. Modeling increased credit access as a relaxation of
the credit constraint, dividing (1’-4’) by dΩ , and solving for

(5)

∂L
, we find that
∂Ω

[

]

∂L − 1
2
=
⋅ Φ 11Φ 22 − Φ 21 + Φ 11 h11 − r (1 − s )Φ 21 h11 > 0 ,
∂Ω A

or that hired labor increases in an enterprise with expanded access to credit. Equation (5),
however, also reveals the effect of the marginal value of home activity on enterprise
employment. If the function h reflecting the utility of home activity displays minimal
concavity (“a woman’s chores are never done”), then h11 is close to zero, and the effect of
better credit access on generating employment in female enterprises is significantly reduced
by the last two terms in (5). Conversely, when the h function is highly concave, h11 is large,
and this reflects a limit to a woman’s duties at home. As seen in (5) when h11 is large, this
amplifies the effect of access to credit on employment creation. From (5) we can also show
that

∂2L
< 0 , implying that if female entrepreneurs face higher supervision costs, the
∂Ω∂s

impact of access to credit on employment generation is smaller.
The model also yields an expression for the direct effect of access to credit on gross
sales (a key variable in the Guatemalan survey data). Using Cramer’s rule as in (5), it is also
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straightforward to show that

∂K
∂l
> 0 and that
> 0 . Thus we know that the change in
∂Ω
∂Ω

gross income with a small increase in credit access given in (6) is unambiguously positive
when the credit constraint is binding, or
(6)

dΦ
∂K
 ∂L ∂l 
= Φ1
+ Φ2
+
 > 0.
dΩ
∂Ω
 ∂Ω ∂Ω 

Note that the impact of access to credit on gross income is similar to the impact on
employment generation: positive, yet high supervision costs will dampen the positive effect
of increased credit access (

∂ 2Φ
< 0 ). We now compare the predictions of the model with
∂Ω∂s

the Guatemalan data.

3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM GUATEMALAN DATA
The Guatemalan data is taken from a 1994 survey of 358 entrepreneurs in western
Guatemala. The current study utilizes information from 342 of these entrepreneurs for whom
appropriate data for this study was available. The sample is composed of 260 borrowers of
FUNDAP, an ACCION-affiliated microenterprise lending institution which began lending in
the region in 1988, and 82 entrepreneurs displaying very similar characteristics to the
FUNDAP borrowers, but who were located in areas just outside the reach of FUNDAP's
credit program. Thus the 82 non-FUNDAP entrepreneurs serve as a control group.
Each entrepreneur was a member of a borrowing group consisting of three to six
members. The 260 FUNDAP borrowers belonged to 137 borrowing groups, 76 of which
were male borrowing groups, 14 of which were female borrowing groups, and 47 of which
were mixed-gender groups. Table 1 provides statistics on the management of borrowed
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capital within the group, propensity of mutual financial assistance within the group in
repayment of loans, and the average number of days late with payments in the groups history
of a typical (3-month) loan. (Insert Table 1 here.) Gender differences between borrowing
groups are interesting: female borrowing groups displayed the fewest instances of misuse of
funds, but in female groups less mutual financial assistance was given among group members
in repaying loans. Overall, the lower instances of moral hazard allowed female groups to
outperform the male borrowing groups, averaging nearly one day per loan less in arrears than
their male counterparts. Performance was worst among the mixed-gender groups. As seen in
Table 1 instances of misuse of funds were highest in mixed-gender groups, intra-group
financial assistance was lowest, and mixed-gender groups ranked last in arrears performance.
These data indicate that female entrepreneurs are at least as capable at managing credit as
their male counterparts, if not more so. (Insert Table 2 here.) Table 2 gives logit estimations
similar to those contained in Wydick (1999), which, controlling for a host of other group
characteristics, show very little statistically significant difference in the performance of male
and female borrowing groups, except that the male groups appear to provide more intra-group
insurance.
We turn now to the discussion of the effects of the credit program on employment
and sales. Descriptive statistics and definitions of variables for the 358 entrepreneurs are
given in Table 3. (Insert Table 3 here.) Most interesting are the differences between the
94 female entrepreneurs and the 264 male entrepreneurs. The average age of the women
included in the survey is nearly equal to that of the men, 37.0 years and 35.9 years,
respectively. Interestingly, the female entrepreneurs in the sample are slightly more
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educated than the male entrepreneurs; the average number of years of formal education for
women being 4.38, while for men it is 3.63.
Female entrepreneurs tended to be more heavily located in the urban areas and were
somewhat less likely to be engaged in manufacturing activity than the male entrepreneurs (i.e.
more likely to be engaged in retail trade). The average years of credit access to the sample
was also nearly identical, just over two years. The average initial loan size for male
borrowers (1132 quetzales) was larger than the average initial female loan (781 quetzales),
and this difference persisted such that current loans sizes among borrowers were also quite
different, with 2082 quetzales for men and 1493 quetzales for women (the exchange rate
during this period was roughly 5.5 quetzales per US dollar). As mentioned previously, the
number of hired laborers in the female enterprises is significantly smaller than the number in
male enterprises. Before credit, the average number of employees in a female entrepreneur's
enterprise was 0.69 compared to 1.06 within a male entrepreneur's enterprise. The absolute
change in employment (after receiving access to credit) is also about two-thirds as much for
women; but the percentage changes in employment are roughly equal (about 70%). Initial
levels of sales are similar between men and women, while the percent change in sales is
lower for women (60% versus 75%).
One problem endemic to this kind of study is that of selection bias, i.e. that borrowers
in the credit program may share unobservable personal characteristics which are different
than those of the control group. While it is impossible to create a perfect control group based
on unobservables, the observable characteristics of the control group were extremely close to
those of program participants. In both the treatment and control groups, the average age was
approximately 36 years old. Female entrepreneurs made up approximately one fourth of both
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program participants and the control group. Mean monthly sales were US$371 for program
participants and were US$432 for members of the control group three years before the
survey. Mean years of formal education were 3.26 and 4.86 years for program participants
and the control group, respectively. Thus the control group, selected from areas not yet
targeted by the program, was perhaps slightly more educated with slightly larger enterprises.
Table 4 presents results from five estimations that explore the determinants of change
in employment in microenterprises. (Insert Table 4 here.) The dependent variable is the
difference between current employment and previous employment. A tobit procedure is used
since approximately 30% of the entrepreneurs experienced no change in employment,
creating a truncation in the distribution of the dependent variable. (We also estimated the
equations using a Poisson maximum-likelihood regression and using ordered-probit, both
reflecting the integer nature of the data , i.e. number of employees rather than hours worked.
The other techniques yielded essentially similar results.) Simple Chow tests on OLS
specifications suggest that specification (1) is better than separating the sample by gender, but
that separating is better for differentiating between small-scale producers productores (e.g.
handicrafts, candles) and retail traders known as comerciantes. We have chosen to present
various pooled and separated results, and in column (4) the pooled regressions with gender
dummies. (For retail traders no variables are significant, so we do not present separate
results for them.)
One special feature of the sample, that makes assessment of the effects of credit less
than straightforward, is that survey data for borrowers in the credit program yielded before
and after changes with respect to when they joined the credit program. Among program
participants, 79 had been in the program one year or less, 89 for two years, 44 for three years,
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23 for four years, and 14 for five or more years; with the average being 2.32. For the control
group, the survey attempted to capture changes in variables over the previous three years.
Thus, the time frame for before-after comparisons differs among respondents. Entrepreneurs
who had received credit for n years reported on employment and sales changes over that nyear period, while the control group reported changes in employment over three years. We
control for these differences in ‘cohorts’ with the variable TIME, that varies from 0.1 to 6
(for those who joined one month previously to those who joined six years previously). The
TIME variable captures any secular trend in the overall economic environment. During the
period considered, 1988-1993, the economy of Guatemala was relatively stable, displaying
only moderate growth. We would expect then to find that employment and sales grew more
for those reporting growth over a longer period. As the table shows, TIME is positive and
often significant in the various specifications; the longer the time between the current period
and the reference period for previous employment, the larger is growth in employment.
We do not transform the growth numbers into annual growth rates, because the effects
of credit may be felt most in the first year of credit provision and less thereafter, i.e. the
relation is non-linear. We capture this by including a squared term TIMESQCR. While this
variable is insignificant in most regressions (and hence dropped), it does turn out to be
important for productores, and so we include it in that regression. The sign is negative, as
expected; all else equal, longer time in the credit program (after the first year or two) does not
continue to generate large increases in employment.
The key variables in these estimations are CRED, a dummy taking a value one if the
entrepreneur was a member of the credit program, CREDFEM, in which a dummy taking the
value of one for female entrepreneurs is interacted with CRED, and AGEFEM, which
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interacts the female dummy with the age of the entrepreneur. CRED is uniformly positive
and highly significant. Regarding gender differences in employment generation, Table 4
shows that female entrepreneurs in general are less likely to see employment growth; the
effect on FEM is large, significant, and negative (particularly so for productores). AGEFEM
is significant and positive, revealing that older female entrepreneurs realize more
employment growth in their enterprises than younger female entrepreneurs.
A comparison of the credit program effects by age for men and for women can be
seen in Figure 1. (Insert Figure 1 here.) These figures contain the predicted increases in
employment generated from the tobit estimation (4) in Table 4. The estimations generate
predictions of the number of employees in an enterprise given the censored distribution of the
dependent variable (see Maddala (1983) p. 159). The expression used to generate the
predictions from our model is given by

E ( y i ) = Λ β ′ x + σλ

(7)

where y is the change in employment within an enterprise, Λ and λ in (7) represent,
respectively, the normal distribution and density functions evaluated at their sample means,
β ′ is the vector of tobit-estimated coefficients, x is the vector of sample means of

independent variables (except for age which is varied across ages 20 to 64 and dummy
variables which take values of 0 and 1 where appropriate), and σ is the standard error of the
estimation.
Figure 1 uses the estimations in Table 4 column 4 to show the predicted differences in
increases in employment for participants and non-participants in the credit program by
gender. First note that for non-participants the predicted number of employees added to
enterprises is greater for male than for female entrepreneurs at every age level of the
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entrepreneur. However, for credit program participants, these differences change
dramatically. Holding all other variables constant at the sample means, predicted
employment generation for female borrowers in childbearing years (generally through the
20’s for Guatemalan women) is significantly lower than that for men. However, the
predicted number of added employees for female entrepreneurs in the credit program
continues to increase for women until it peaks at age 42, while the figure for men peaks at
age 30. After age 33, the predicted number of employees added for women actually passes
that for the men, reaching a peak of 1.01 employees added at age 42 and then slowly
declining.
A life-cycle consistent with the predictions of our model is clear in the data: While in
their 20’s male entrepreneurs are predicted to add from 0.20 to 0.35 more employees than
female entrepreneurs of the same age. But from approximately age 45 to age 60, female
entrepreneurs are predicted to add about 0.35 to 0.5 more employees to their enterprises than
their male counterparts. It is important to remember, however, that the predicted values in
Figure 1 are generated holding all variables except age and participation in the credit program
constant at the sample means. Male entrepreneurs, for example, are much more apt to be
productores, who are more likely to add employees to their enterprises than comerciantes,
and thus in actuality the number of employees actually added to enterprises may be skewed
more toward males.
Table 5 presents results of similar regressions explaining the change in sales of the
enterprise. (Insert Table 5 here.) The Chow tests here indicate that pooling is appropriate,
but we present the separated samples also for comparison with Table 4. Again the variable
TIME is positive and significant in most regressions. The variable CRED, the dummy for
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participation in the credit program, is again significant and positive. The dummy variable for
URBAN is negative; there seems to be less growth in sales in the urban areas. Lastly, in
these regressions the EDUC variable, measuring the education of the entrepreneur, is
significant and positive, especially for men. Importantly, these estimations show no
significant differences between men and women, with respect to change in sales over the
reporting period.
The estimations in Tables 4 and 5 show the highly significant effect of years of credit
access on both employment and gross sales for both male and female borrowers. The
regression results suggest a positive impact of credit access on employment and sales
generation. Loans to productores (small-scale manufacturers) are more effective at
stimulating employment than loans to comerciantes (retailers), as shown by the significance
of the PROD dummy in the estimations. However, there is no statistically significant
difference between the two types of enterprises in changes in gross sales. There is some
evidence that rural borrowers generate employment and sales at a greater rate than urban
borrowers.
Differences do indeed exist between the responses of male and female entrepreneurs
to credit, especially with respect to employment generation. We interpret these differences as
stemming from changes in the marginal value of home activity through the stages of a
woman's life. Interpreted in light of our model, until the age at which a female entrepreneur‘s
children are grown, her marginal value of home activity h1 is very high and displays very
little concavity (h11 is very low), rendering the supervision of labor very expensive at all
levels of economic activity. For women past this age, reduced demands in home activity
allow them to realize increases in hired labor within their enterprises equal or greater than
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that of men in the Guatemalan data sample. These results also support the notion that it is the
high marginal value of home time for women during certain periods of their lives, rather than
higher supervision costs for all women, which acts as the principal constraint to growth of the
female enterprise.
In summary, the Guatemalan data show young male entrepreneurs to be more
aggressive in generating employment than older male entrepreneurs, but older women to be
more aggressive in generating employment than younger women or older men. Job growth in
the informal sector is generated by younger men and older women. Controlling for other
factors, the results in this study indicate no statistically significant difference in the ability of
female and male entrepreneurs to generate increases in business sales within an enterprise
upon provision of increased access to credit.

4. CONCLUSIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY
This research has sought to address a question in the development literature over
whether targeting microenterprise credit at women involves sacrificing economic growth in
favor of poverty reduction and the welfare of children. If this trade-off exists, where
specifically does it occur? Our research suggests that targeting microenterprise credit at
women, in certain circumstances, does appear to embody a trade-off of economic growth in
favor of poverty reduction. The empirical results presented here show that during
childbearing years in which women must allocate much of their time to caring for children,
female entrepreneurs are restricted in their ability to generate employment within their
enterprises compared to other entrepreneurs in the sample. Nevertheless, it is among

18

this subset of women for which increases in income are likely to have the greatest positive
effect on the welfare of children (Pitt and Khandker, 1998).
Among women past their mid-thirties, however, this trade-off does not appear to
exist. The Guatemalan data show the rate of increase in hired labor in the enterprises of older
women to be on par with those of men, although absolute increases in hired labor are slightly
smaller because of the smaller size of women's enterprises. Moreover, our results indicate no
statistically significant difference in increases in business sales after credit provision between
female and male entrepreneurs. Thus, while the predictions of our model hold well for
differences in changes in enterprise employment, they do not hold for differences in gross
sales.
The research also suggests focusing on the sharp concavity that exists in the
production function of household enterprises in developing countries. It is a mistake to
assume that sustained microenterprise financing can routinely take household enterprises
from a size of one or two employees to a size of, say, twenty to thirty employees. The
Guatemalan data show that the typical case is for an entrepreneur is to move from
self-employment or maybe from a single hired laborer, to perhaps two to three hired laborers.
After this point continued access to credit begins to display heavily diminishing returns with
respect to both increases in hired labor and increases in sales for both male, as well as female,
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, as this performance is replicated across a large number of
borrowers, it can result in quite significant increases in household welfare and employment in
a given area targeted with microenterprise credit.
A number of suggestions for development policy flow from the results presented here.
First, development practitioners involved in microenterprise lending schemes should not steer
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credit away from women, based on a belief that their enterprises are likely to grow more
slowly than those operated by male entrepreneurs. If a given region is experiencing
abnormally high rates of infant malnutrition, for example, a strategy specifically targeting
credit at young women may be entirely appropriate. Second, if female entrepreneurs'
preferences heavily favor investment in the well-being of children (Blumberg, 1989),
microenterprise lending institutions may be able to "double dip" by targeting credit at
middle-aged women; younger grandmothers are likely to have low marginal supervision
costs, but are also likely to direct profits toward the welfare of grandchildren. Third, there is
no evidence from this study which indicates that female entrepreneurs face a disadvantage
with respect to men in the area of income generation or in the area of loan repayment; in fact,
there is evidence presented here that suggests that repayment rates may be greater among
women. Lastly, it is important for development practitioners not to become overly optimistic
about the prospect of being able to realize soaring levels of growth in individual
microenterprises such that they can be "graduated" into formal sector financing. A realistic
and worthy goal for microcredit programs is to bring about moderate increases in
employment generation and household income, along with great improvements in the
financial stability of the enterprise. These marginal improvements in the economic well-being
may be enough to allow the (hopefully better educated) children of these entrepreneurs to lift
their households into more substantial increases in welfare.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on borrowing groups and performance

no instances of
loan misuse
propensity for
intra-group
insurance
average number
of days in
arrears per loan
in group history
number of
groups

all groups
.73

female
groups
.86

male
groups
.72

mixed
groups
.70

.52

.42

.62

.38

4.26

3.19

4.09

4.85

137

14

76

47
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Table 2: Logit estimates on determinants of group performance
1
2
3
mitigation of moral provision of mutual overall group repayment
hazard
insurance (logit)
coeff. std.err. sig. coeff. std.err. sig. coeff.
CONSTANT -0.945 1.608
-2.746 1.755
13.563
ALLWOM
0.793 0.936
0.413 0.804
-2.573

Explanation of Variables:

0.497

0.524

1.307 0.522 **

-1.219

YRSKNOW -0.001

0.028

-0.080 0.032 **

-0.076

SOCACT

-0.350

0.448

-0.047 0.475

3.035

PRESSR

0.893

0.474 *

-0.078 0.497

-3.241

std.err. sig.
5.829 **
3.120
Dummy =1 if borrowing group all
female members
1.980
Dummy = 1if borrowing group all
male members
0.105
Years members were acquainted
before group foundation
1.728 *
Dummy =1 if group share social
activities
1.849 *
Dummy = 1 if willingness to

DIFFSS

-1.064

0.469 **

0.095 0.530

0.297

1.930

MEM

0.520

0.474

0.763 0.494

-0.963

1.690

CORRECT

1.541

0.682 **

-0.114 0.638

-2.833

2.275

GTFRNDS

0.358

0.749

-0.045 0.841

-1.405

2.912

AVGDIST

-0.182

0.295

-1.027 0.375 **

0.256

1.166

KNOWSAL

0.853

0.483 *

0.914 0.480 *

-3.164

1.780 *

SAMEBUS

-0.904

0.508 *

1.000 0.501 **

1.530

1.850

OTRLOAN

0.702

0.767

-0.182 0.671

-1.676

2.620

YRSG
Loglikelihood

0.170 0.185
-65.66

0.431 0.219 **
-61.58

-0.828 0.704
-83.26

ALLMEN

pressure others to repay

137

137

137

* Significant at the 90 percent level of confidence
** Significant at the 95 percent level of confidence
*** Significant at the 99 percent level of confidence
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Dummy = 1 if members feel
applying sanctions difficult
Number of members in the
borrowing group

Dummy = 1 if state moral
obligation to repay group loan
Dummy = 1 if say repay to stay
on good terms with group
Average distance in kilometers
between members' businesses
Dummy = 1 if members know
weekly sales of other members
Dummy = 1 if members engaged in
same line of business
Dummy = 1 if at least one members
has other credit access
Age of borrowing group (in years)

Table 3: Sample Statistics
1
whole sample

2
men only

3
women only variable definition

std. mean std. mean std.
dev.
dev.
dev.
36.19 10.10 35.88 9.71 37.00 11.10 age of entrepreneur
3.83
3.18
3.63 2.95
4.38 3.70 years of education of entrepreneur
0.32
0.22
0.60
1=in urban area, 0=in rural area
0.72
0.80
0.51
1=productor 0=comerciante
0.79
0.78
0.81
1=in credit program 0=not in program
2.15
1.37
2.17 1.31
2.10 1.51 years since joined credit program
(for credit prog. participants only)
1033 2881 1132 3311
781 1241 amount of first loan (in USD)
(for credit prog. participants only)
1916 3366 2082 3852 1493 1491 amount of last loan (in USD)
(for credit prog. participants only)
0.96
1.47
1.06 1.47
0.69 1.45 initial number of employees
0.69
1.33
0.77 1.29
0.48 1.40 change in number of employees
2227 3714 2244 3630 2175 3969 initial sales of enterprise (in USD)
1592 5133 1697 5702 1291 2939 change in sales of enterprise (in USD)
0.27
1=female 0=male
342
248
94

mean
AGE
EDUC
URBAN
PROD
CRED
TIME
FLOAN
LLOAN
EP
ECH
SALESP
SALESCH
FEM
N
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Table 4: Tobit estimates of determinants of change in number of employees
(Coefficients are marginal effects, evaluated at sample means.)
1
whole sample

2
men only

coeff. std. err. sig. coeff.

Constant

-2.844

0.800***

std. err. sig

-4.390

1.084***

3
women only
coeff.

std. err. sig

4
whole sample
coeff.

std. err. sig

5
productores only
coeff.

std. err. sig

-1.264

0.968

-2.546

0.802***

-3.240

1.267 ***

0.026

0.023

0.019

0.019

0.025

0.031

0.106

0.060 *

EDUC

0.017

0.019

0.010

0.023

AGE

0.059

0.037

0.158

0.057***

-0.014

0.043

0.060

0.038

AGE2

-0.090

0.049*

-0.249

0.079***

0.025

0.054

-0.105

0.052**

-0.172

0.083**

URBAN

-0.139

0.166

0.111

0.206

-0.442

0.239*

-0.138

0.166

-0.252

0.262

PROD

0.986

0.182***

0.945

0.236***

0.513

0.231** 0.943

0.181***

TIME

0.238

0.149*

0.317

0.185*

0.132

0.193

0.240

0.143*

0.500

0.233**

CRED

0.806

0.315**

0.841

0.376**

0.926

0.485*

0.660

0.306**

1.296

0.491***

-0.018

0.038

-0.028

0.024

-0.066

0.041*

FEM

-1.653

0.609***

-2.677

0.995***

AGEFEM

0.027

0.013**

0.055

0.022**

CREDFEM

0.801

0.459*

0.959

0.716

TIMESQCR

-0.027

0.025

-0.038

0.030

log-L

-412.15

-313.50

-87.30

-407.79

-360.87

n

342

248

94

342

247
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Table 5: OLS estimates of determinants of log change in sales
1
whole sample
coeff.

2
men only

std. err. sig coeff.

3
women only

std. err. sig coeff.

std. err. sig

4
whole sample
coeff.

std. err. sig

5
productores only
std. err. sig

coeff.

Constant

3.751

1.810**

2.900

2.173**

5.993

3.375

3.589

1.911**

2.860

2.643

EDUC

0.143

0.054**

0.183

0.066*

0.053

0.098

0.132

0.054**

0.086

0.074

AGE

0.029

0.087

0.075

0.105

-0.080

0.168

0.040

0.089

0.150

0.114

AGE2

-0.075

0.109

-0.110

0.130

-0.004

0.209

-0.068

0.109

-0.210

0.146

URBAN

-1.204

0.451*

-0.840

0.543

-1.690

0.941*

-1.094

0.466*

-1.015

0.603

PROD

-0.373

0.448

-0.405

0.548

-0.652

0.839

-0.450

0.450

TIME

0.319

0.131**

0.181

0.160

0.556

0.235**

0.308

0.131**

-0.193

0.546

CRED

1.396

0.397***

1.281

0.456**

2.255

0.842**

1.271

0.451**

0.215

1.139

0.884

1.417

1.194

1.888

-0.056

0.033

-0.047

0.047

0.824

0.866

0.245

1.295

0.077

0.095

FEM
AGEFEM
CREDFEM
TIMSQCR
adj. R2

.072

.045

.121

.080

.027

n

342

240

94

342

247
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Figure 1: Predicted Increase in Employees
by Age of Entrepreneur: Men and Women
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